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Abstract
Understanding how laws are adjudicated on a local level can be just as sig-
ni$cant as understanding their origins. Crime rates and how they &uctuate 
relative to policing policies can reveal trends that can be traced back to social, 
economic, and cultural in&uences. When comparing China, Mexico, and 
Russia, we $nd that the similarities and di"erences can enlighten criminal 
behavior by contrasting statistics with national identity. When taken into 
the context of political development, e"ective policing policy could be ex-
trapolated and identi$ed.
To Protect and Serve
China, Mexico and Russia are constantly in the mainstream media, with 
evocative occurrences dominating contemporary discussion. In the United 
States, reports of police abuse $ll the news cycle consistently. Regardless of 
how one may feel about each report individually, it is an undeniable symptom 
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that a problem exists with the culture on either side of the badge. Some 
think that the problem is institutional, but perhaps culture is the causal link 
to public safety instead. A comparative look at the police forces in other 
countries may shed some light. Mexico is constantly wracked by drug cartel 
violence and general unrest. Russia, for most intents and purposes, appears to 
have a relatively sound internal situation, yet an aggressive foreign strategy. 
China is thrusting itself onto the world stage, proclaiming its adequacy and 
controlling its domestic involvement. Policy implementation and adjudi-
cation at the lowest level, known as law enforcement, is clearly executed 
better in China than in Russia, which is then better than Mexico. Why is it 
that Mexico has experienced an institutional failure, while Russia has been 
able to maintain a relatively ethical hold on its police force, and China has 
been able to drastically reduce its crime? #e answer lies in the political 
development of the states, namely how their power dynamics have changed 
recently. In Mexico, where bribes and exploitation of power are the norm, 
the development of the country has led to the same systemic corruption that 
is being fought in Russia. China uses corruption to its advantage. Mexico’s 
system generates a higher per capita murder rate than Russia, as well as other 
key crime statistics. #e ability to combat these criminal numbers lies within 
the strong authoritarian power of the contemporary Russian government. 
#e Russians are attempting to mitigate the same problems that Mexico 
has encountered because they have the ability to reform their police force.
Some may argue that a country’s ability to $ght crime simply relies on a 
high police force per capita. After all, Mexico has 371.2 police o!cers per 
100,000 people compared to Russia’s 522.0, as of 2013. In Mexico, there 
were 18.9 murders per 100,000 people in 2013, compared to the 9.0 ratio 
of Russia.1 However, China possesses 120 police o!cers per 100,000 in 
2007, with a 1.2 ratio of the same metric. #at same ratio was 2.0 in 2002, 
and 0.8 in 2012.2 An argument can be made that the problem of ine"ective 
policing is not due to an ine!ciency of resources, but that it is tied to the 
citizenry and to the development of the country. Even though these countries 
1  United Nations O!ce of Drugs and Crime. n.d. UNODC Statistics. Accessed November 
2, 2015. https://data.unodc.org/.
2  Xinhua News Agency. 2007. China to Unify Police Identity Card from Jan. 1. January 1. 
Accessed November 30, 2015.
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have recently taken a departure from authoritarian governments, except for 
China, which has only just departed from an ‘authoritarian’ economy, the 
Russian social and political culture stands out as a more stable, law-abiding 
society compared to Mexico. Mexican political development is character-
ized by three concepts relevant to law enforcement: unstable change, a mix 
of interest articulation, and a weak society and weak state. Compared to 
Russian political development, which consists of a strong society and state 
and relatively strong interest articulation, (political changes in Russian history 
are somewhat stable, though not always) Mexico opens a window for self-in-
terested parties to manipulate the system. Chinese political development is 
focused on a hierarchical structure of society, where one must ‘keep his/her 
station’. Previously, Russian interest articulation was heavily “…regulated by 
the Communist Party, and there could be no open, active competition among 
political parties or interest groups for support…”3 #is level of control is 
similar to how China’s dual-rule system operates today. More recently, after 
perestroika and glasnost, as well as the fall of the Soviet Union, Russians 
have been more vocal about their ideologies, while still advocating for strong 
state control. Russian activists now believe “… [that] institutionalism of 
state power is a prerequisite for civil society development…”4 #is allows for 
stronger participation in the political, and thus law making process. “… ‘[T]
rust in the [national] political system’ has the strongest in&uence on police 
attitudes in nine Latin American countries… with citizens… [not expressing 
con$dence] in the less well-performing democrac[y]… of Mexico.”5 Mexico 
is hindered by their lack of trust in a system that they cannot participate 
in fully. Why should they continue to vote, rally, and caucus if someone is 
going to sweep in by force and declare themselves the winner? “#e…(in)
formal rules of municipal governance [in Mexico] result in a lack of horizontal 
3  Remington, #omas. n.d. Politics in Russia. 7. New York: Routledge. Accessed November 
2, 2015.
4  Taylor, Brian D. 2006. “Law Enforcement and Civil Society in Russia.” Europe-Asia Stud-
ies 58 (2): 193-213. Accessed November 2, 2015.
5   Walker, Lee Demetrius, and Richard Waterman W. 2008. “Elections as Focusing Events: 
Explaining Attitudes toward the Police and the Government in Comparative Perspective.” 
Law & Society Review 42 (2): 337-366.
paideia
176
accountability and reform continuity.”6 #is distrust has generated a caustic 
political outlook that cannot be sustained long-term.
China complicates this argument. #eir authoritarian government is e"ec-
tively accepted by the citizenry and social harmony is a core tenet of Chinese 
culture. While one may argue that having a strong central power is what 
keeps Chinese crime in check (crime meaning homicide rates in this case, 
obviously there is a broad range of crimes to be compared, but for the purpose 
of this paper, homicides will be used as a general indicator) asserting that 
it is both an increase in economic prowess and overall Chinese culture that 
maintains the low crime rates. #e core beliefs of Confucianism necessitate 
a rule of morality and benevolence. In contrast to Russian and Mexican cul-
tural history, which typically generates a more violent sociological response. 
While Chinese political history has hardly been paci$stic, Confucius created 
a now ingrained idea of a harmonious hierarchy and social unity that brings 
the Chinese people to behave more peacefully in their daily interaction with 
one another compared to what we see in Russia and Mexico. One is expected 
to live with the good of the society in mind, not in a self-serving way that 
commonly breeds crime. #is leads to the argument that moral obligations 
could be the source of the di"erences in crime rates, not because of institu-
tional guidance, but because of the public cultural psyche.
Corruption further hinders law enforcement in all areas. In Mexico the 
police o!cers on the ground are part of an institution of corruption, one that 
is focused on a self-centered mindset, not rule of law. #is again stems from 
a mistrust in the government; that one should take any and all precautions to 
help oneself, because the political system is unreliable. While Russian police 
forces have historically used extortion and bribery in their enforcement, the 
economy of Russia has grown, allowing for economically supported change, 
as well as less incentive for the Russian o!cers to line their own pockets. In 
2011, the Russian government overhauled its police force by $ring 170,000 
allegedly corrupt o!cers and raising the remaining o!cers’ salaries.7 Aimed 
6  Pansters, Wil G. 2013. “Reviewed Work: Police Reform in Mexico. Informal Politics 
and the Challenge of Institutional Change by Daniel M. Sabet.” European Review of Latin 
American and Caribbean Studies / Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 
(Centrum voor Studie en Documentatie van Latijns Amerika (CEDLA)) 95: 128-131.
7  Russia Today. 2011. “Russia’s rebranded police initiated with major layo"s.” Russia Today. 
March 1. Accessed November 2, 2015.
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at combating corruption, this reform was sweeping in its e"orts to address 
the chronic enforcement issues identi$ed by the government. #is can only 
happen in a country with strong interest articulation. When the citizens 
are dissatis$ed, they voice their opinions to elected o!cials or through 
their votes; which, in Russia’s case, created a need for police reform. It is no 
coincidence that this is happening now in the post-Cold War era. #e now 
strong, reorganized variant of Russian law enforcement is a sharp contrast 
from the decentralized and unregulated policing of Mexican law enforcement.
Yet, China has comparatively weak interest articulation compared to Russia, 
as the political agenda is tightly controlled by the Communist party. However, 
this grip on policy allows for e"ective change to be implemented quickly. As 
such, gun restrictions, regulations, and penal codes can adapt to a changing 
social landscape faster than it can in Russia and Mexico, which holds as 
another reason for low crime rates in China. To expand, China’s &ourishing 
economy causes Russia’s to pale in comparison. #e corruption that persists 
in Chinese governance and enforcement can allow economic growth to con-
tinue and the authoritarian hold on policy making to subsist. #is can then 
cycle back into itself, as “the survival of a relatively strong state, in turn, can 
help to prevent the worst types of corruption from dominating society and 
market activities.”8 Policing to ensure social harmony is a key aspect of law 
enforcement in China. In 1991 (China stopped reporting police sta!ng in 
1992), 34.9 percent of #e People’s Police were “social order police” and 
only 20.4 percent of o!cers were tra!c or criminal police.9 While one could 
argue the semantics of the di"erent types of police o!cers, it is clear that 
law enforcement is used just as much as a social tool as it is a peace one.
However, after Mexico’s PRI party was removed from presidential power 
in 2000, how come Mexican democratization did not improve conditions 
in law enforcement? According to Daniel Sabet, the current political cul-
ture in Mexico creates “…a lack of horizontal accountability between the 
municipal president and the city council and… a lack of reform continuity 
across administrations… these two factors generate systematic obstacles to 
8  Sun, Yan. 1999. “Reform, State, and Corruption: Is Corruption Less Destructive in China 
than in Russia?” Comparative Politics 32 (1): 1-20.
9  Wong, Kam C. 2002. “Policing in the People’s Republic of China: #e Road to Reform in 
the 1990s.” !e British Journal of Criminology 42 (2): 281-316.
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institutional change.”10 #ese accountability problems $nd their beginnings 
in the cultural disassociation that the Mexican people have with government, 
seated in a history full of revolution, dissent, and a strong caudillo system 
that exists throughout Latin America. While the Russians have had almost 
30 years removed from their authoritative ruling party, the Mexicans are 
still dealing with the recent repercussions of a paradigm shift, as well as 
internal violence from organized crime. China, more authoritarian than 
either of the other two countries, has been capable of a tranquil domestic 
existence, thanks to the cultural upbringing of the population. #erefore, 
di"erences in policing originate from cultural and system wide con&icts, 
not simply numbers.
By connecting the examples explored, we can conclude that Mexico’s 
police ine!cacy is tied to the developmental shortcomings, identi$ed as a 
lack of political involvement on the local level and little incentive to im-
prove, thanks to the government’s impotence. Furthermore, Russia’s marked 
improvement in the $eld of law enforcement is linked to its increase in 
interest articulation, as well as its stronger horizontal accountability and 
civic involvement. Until the Mexican government and nation are able to 
address the blockages in the system by changing the culture of policing 
and aversion towards rule of law, organized crime will continue to &ourish, 
with Mexico as its casualty. China has been successful in maintaining a safe 
social society, while contributing to the development of a civil one. Are 
the costs to democracy, despite political legitimacy worth it? For now, the 
Chinese people agree. Despite arguably similar ideologies in authoritarian 
governments, the political development of China, Russia, and Mexico has 
led to di"erent outcomes in policy enforcement.
10  Sabet, Daniel M. 2012. Police Reform in Mexico: Informal Politics and the Challenge of 
Institutional Change. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
